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"THE ARGUMENTS FROM DJENNÉ"
CONCERNING THE PLANNED TALO DAM


By: L"Association des ressortissants de Djenné a Bamako,
October 28, 1998

(CLICK HERE for French Version)

      I. BACKGROUND

The "Circle" (county) of Djenné covers 4,500 square kilometers in the heart of the central delta and at the confluence of the Bani and Niger Rivers. Its population is around 145,000, organized in 187 villages.

Ever since remotest times, about 80% of this 'circle' has been inundated from July to March, thanks to the annual flood crests of the Bani and Niger Rivers. Thus, in Djenné more than 500,000 hectares are devoted to rice cultivation, pasture and fishing, thanks to the vast 'bourgoutieres' of Mourari, Yoghari, Manghari, Fakala, Pondori, Djenerie, etc., which from January to June sustain the great herds of the "Circles" of Djenné, Tenenkou, Mopti, Bankass, Koro, Bandiagara, Douentza, Youwarour, San, Macina, Tominian, Niafunke, Goundam and Dire.

To summarize: In Djenné, the [annual] floodings of the Bani and Niger Rivers condition the life, environment, economy and culture of the region, upon which our communities depend.

Meanwhile, due to endemic dessication and the construction of the Selingue Dam, Djenné - like the entire region of Mopti - has faced a considerable decline in flood levels, economic activities, ecology and quality of life, even to the point of threatening human survival.

      II. PROJECTS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BANI

For all of the above reasons, in 1976 the Government of Mali initiated the "Dam of Djenné Project" on the Bani, for which studies were completed in 1984 by the MDR, SEDES, and Cooperation Francaise. The project envisions, on the one hand, securing 136,000 hectares for rice cultivation, pasturage, fisheries and forestry in the basins of Pondori, Djenneri, Kodougou, Femaya, Derari, Niensanari and Manghari and, on the other hand, securing the ORM casiers of Konio, Bougalo, Sarantomo, Sin-Sofara-Hamdallaye, Torokoro-Kouna, Sofouroulaye, [and] South Mopti for around 20,000 hectares. In addition, the Dam Project [proposed] for Djenné contained a provision for rural electricity.

In 1985, the Government of Mali also initiated the Talo Dam Project, for which preliminary studies were completed by the GR. At the national conference of May '91, and again during the visit of President Alpha Ourmar Konare in 1997, the populations of Djenné expressed their distress and pled with authorities to give close attention to guaranteeing the flooding of our valleys. In April 1998, as MDRE was visiting the region of Mopti, they heard the same fears expressed in Djenné, whereupon they instructed the people to reorient and adapt their economic activity due to the imminent construction of the Talo Dam. This was no sooner said than - as the Minister witnessed - there was, among the Djenneians, an immediate reaction, both natural and violent, against this project which - if pursued without safeguards - poses grave threats to their lives and security.

      III. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE CIRCLE OF DJENNE ARE:

            1. Regarding the environment, tradition and customary rights:

The Bani is a gift of God, the communal resource of all the riverside populations. More recently, it has been integrated into the public water domain of the nation of Mali. In either case, some cooperation and some form of consensus is necessary for human interventions which reapportion the benefits of the River to the advantage of a given region. In the proper development of our National Heritage, the waters and valleys of the Bani should be evaluated by the State according to a development plan, which sets its priorities according to the interest of Mali. Contrary to these elementary but sacrosanct principles, Djenné and the Region of Mopti were never consulted by the promoters and fundraisers for the Talo Dam Project until after the decision by the Council of Ministers and the adoption of the project by the National Assembly. This means that inquiries as to the socio-economic impact of the [proposed Dam] project, if made at all, deliberately ignored the communities downstream.

            2. The goals of Talo

Seen in the light of the national interest, Djenné does not doubt for an instant that the Talo Project will have an economic impact both locally and nationally. In effect, the project forecasts 24,000 hectares of rice cultivation and water culture, allowing a maximum of 15,000 T of paddy yielding...9,000 T of rice - of which 5,000 T will be marketed outside the zones of production. The envisioned flood plain farming and aqua culture will likewise have a positive impact on nutrition in the Circle of Bla.

The zone of the project, which would specialize in dry land farming, benefits the Southern Malian program of the CMDT. This zone has no shortage of cereal. It is important to realize that the planned beneficiaries of the Talo Project are neither rice farmers nor herdsmen -- least of all the traditional fishermen.

From this it is evident that the Talo Project is not designed to improve modes of production already in place, but rather to create new economic activities, which will compete with an already existing agriculture and threaten its fragile dependency on seasonal floods.

          3. Technical and Socio-economic constraints

                  A. Technical Considerations:

The technical surveys done prior to the Talo Dam Project affirm that "the completion of this dam will result in a general modification of the flood crest of the Bani. Thus, the preliminary study of the Talo Dam [project] says that one of the consequences will be reductions in flood levels of 30 cm for those downstream, indicating a reduction of 600 to 900 hectares of arable land which would be available were the Dam not built."

However, this cost calculation only applies to the 4,000 hectares managed by the Mopti Rice Office (ORM) and fails to take into account the other ORM branches along the Bani or the flood plains outside ORM's development area in the districts of Mougna, Central Djenné, Sofara, Konio, Kouakourou, Soya and Tage ? amounting to another 131,000 hectares. Taking into account these additional lands and applying the same ratio of diminishment to downstream irrigation (22.5%) -- which?is very optimistic -- the holdings hitherto irrigated [by the flood crests] and lost due to the Talo Dam amount to 30,400 hectares.

We are stating loud and clear that the Talo Project, contrary to its developers' claims, is not a system of totally controlled irrigation but rather a system of controlled submersion (like that in the Casier Dorio). Controlled submersion is a discredited water management system. It has guzzled hundreds of billions of francs. As a result, it is stated that unfortunately barely 15 - 20% of the holdings thus managed in the zones OHVN-ORS-ORN-Naifunke-EX Action Sorghum Rice of Gao are annually flooded and productive.

It is worth noting that the financing of the Talo Dam is an acrobatic diversion of funds towards ends which are not honestly avowed and which reflect merit neither on the department in charge nor on [the Government] of Mali. In fact, the initial destination of the diverted cooperation [Bank] funds corresponds better to the priority needs of Mali's national development than those of the [Bani River] region.

Above and beyond the diminished flood levels of the Bani, the valleys of the Circles of San, Djenné and Mopti will inevitably experience a considerable loss of flooding. The reduced volume and altered timing of the floods will compromise around 50,000 hectares of rice farming in the Circle of Djenné and more than 250,000 hectares of "Bourgoutieres" and fisheries in the valley cited above. As a result, the herds of Djenné, Tenenko, Mopti, Bankass, Kjoro, Bandiagara and Douentza will seek in vain their customary pastures from January through June, with obvious implications for the economic, social and cultural life of the region.

Even the few displaced islets of the zone usually set aside for dry cultures would be affected because of the drop generated by the subsequent reduction of the water table.

Djenné takes this opportunity to remind that the flood crest of the Bani has considerable impact on replenishing more than 30% of Lake Debo in August and September. This replenishment in turn determines the effectiveness of the flooding at the bend of the Niger around Timboucou-Gao and above.

It is useful to remember that all management projects on the Bani, which do not respect the continuous derivation circuit system of the River, will be prejudicial to other river inhabitants. In this context, the dam [proposed] for Djenné recognizes the continuous groundwater extraction circuit and has no instance of negative impact on those communities upstream and downstream.

                  B. Socio-Cultural Considerations

The Talo Dam carries a development cost of more than 1,000,000 francs per hectare. Beyond this extravagant luxury, it is synonymous with the eventual destruction of the vast "bourgoutieres" which have always served as vital pasture for the hundreds of thousands of heads of cattle comprising the herds of the Circles of Macina, San, Djenné, Tominian, Mopti, Koro, Bankass and Bandiagara during their period of sojourn (January-June). This raises the risk of another exodus: all these herdsmen who lease our land will have to migrate in search of other pastures, with the added risk of conflicts they may encounter in countries unaccustomed to hosting them.

As for the rice fields in the Basin of Bani, the effects of this project can be summarized thus: The country of Mali will invest nearly 30 billion to exploit 24,000 hectares in the zone of lower Bani and to lose more than 50,000 hectares downstream from the Dam, which makes a total loss of 26,000 hectares plus the cost of the project and other incalculable economic costs.

Among these other costs we mention in passing the dramatic plunge in fish production in that part of the Delta and the departure for better climes of "able bodies" (since the Dam can only use 5,400 farmers at most, according to its planners), causing incalculable damage to the primary, secondary and tertiary economic activities.


CONCLUSION

Djenné does not want any measures of support, especially not in the form of areas irrigated by pumping, since such projects completed at great expense in the regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou, Mopti, Timbuctou, and Gao all floundered due to production costs three times higher than the price of the goods. We also state that, if the Malian authorities are not, at this stage, ready to protect the systems of flood cresting in our delta, then we prefer the situation as it is, without "development" and without any artificial and criminal interference.

To summarize, the financing of the Talo Dam, with the consequences enumerated above, would reduce the efficacy of the enormous investments already made by the ?funders' of ORM and would constitute a grave threat to the environment, economy and life of the Circle of Djenné.

Also, in the interest of decentralization and democracy, we think all development projects should place themselves in the context of a global, concerted broad approach to the basin in question - an approach which establishes the options and priorities of the national interest of Mali proceeding from a consensus of all the affected populations. Such has not been the case here, since Djenné was never informed until after the adoption by the National Assembly of the loan agreement, disdaining even the most basic procedures of [obtaining their requisite consent).

For all these reasons the population of [the Djenné Circle] protest against the hasty, precipitous creation of the Talo Dam. They solicit the competent authorities and the fundraisers to re-examine the Talo project in the context of a General Management Scheme for the Valleys of the Bani, based on a credible socio-economic study.



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